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Abstract—Active service discovery in Wi-Fi involves wireless
stations broadcasting their Wi-Fi fingerprint, i.e. the SSIDs of
their preferred wireless networks. The content of those Wi-Fi
fingerprints can reveal different types of information about the
owner. We focus on the relation between the fingerprints and
the links between the owners. Our hypothesis is that social
links between devices owners can be identified by exploiting
the information contained in the fingerprint. More specifically
we propose to consider the similarity between fingerprints as a
metric, with the underlying idea: similar fingerprints are likely
to be linked. We first study the performances of several similarity
metrics on a controlled dataset and then apply the designed
classifier to a dataset collected in the wild. Finally we discuss
how Wi-Fi fingerprint can reveal informations on the nature of
the links between users. This study is based on a dataset collected
in Sydney, Australia, composed of fingerprints corresponding to
more than 8000 devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The huge popularity of mobile and portable wireless de-
vices, including smart phones, tablets and laptops, has further
increased the widespread of one of the most used wireless
technologies, IEEE 802.11 or Wi-Fi. Included in over a billion
of mobile and portable devices in use worldwide, Wi-Fi is
provided by Access Points (AP) from a vast majority of
homes in the developed and developing world, businesses
and by around 750,000 worldwide hotspots. The extensive
availability of Wi-Fi connectivity, together with a growing
popularity of community networks, has resulted in mobile and
portable devices establishing connections to an increasingly
large number of APs in various locations.
The open nature of Wi-Fi connectivity has raised a number
of privacy concerns in both the media and research literature
[10], [13], [6], including the well publicized Google Street
View collection of traffic from home Wi-Fi APs.
Mobile and portable devices are likely to move across the
coverage areas of different APs, e.g. while a person is traveling
between home and work. In this likely scenario, low-latency
service discovery is a highly desirable feature, as it will
maximize the amount of connection time for such devices. We
note that the Wi-Fi passive discovery mode, in which the AP
periodically sends beacons announcing the AP’s Service Set
IDentifier (SSID), and where devices listening to these probes
select the desired specific SSID, can lead to high discovery
delays. In the active discovery mode, the device periodically
and actively probes the neighborhood for known APs. This
mode, which is supported by operating systems and Wi-Fi
chipset drivers on the majority of devices and often activated
by default, allows a much lower discovery delay. However, the
active discovery mode also raises privacy concerns. Indeed,
while in active discovery mode, the mobile or portable device
is periodically broadcasting, in the clear, the SSIDs of the
APs to which this device has previously been connected
to. The device also broadcasts its MAC address, a globally
unique identifier. As a consequence, the device is not only
advertising its presence to any eavesdropping equipment, but,
as an associated issue, this also makes the owner vulnerable
to location tracking and possibly profiling attacks.
In this paper, we introduce and study a new privacy threat
caused by the Wi-Fi active discovery mode, that is the possi-
bility to infer a relation between devices (and hence the owners
of these devices) based on their device’s “publicly” announced
preferred networks. We refer to the list of preferred networks
stored on a device, either partially or globally collected by
monitoring wireless probes, as a device Wi-Fi fingerprint.
Various sources of Wi-Fi related potential privacy loss have
been addressed in the research literature. The timing pattern
of the probe messages can be used to identify the wireless
interface’s driver[5], or to create a unique device identifier[3].
Our work considers the list of preferred networks as the
fingerprint, rather than the timing of probes. We use this
fingerprint to link selected devices with similar fingerprints,
with the aim of grouping devices and, by association, the
owners of these devices.
The SSID of the probed network can also reveal sensitive
information about the user, as shown in [6], [9], [8]. In
particular, SSIDs can reveal geographical location of users
[12] when combined with specific databases containing APs’
location coordinates, like [1]. Our work is complimentary
to the research showing how user location can be derived
from AP locations, as e.g. users who are detected by our
methodology as linked socially or professionally, may also
reside in a similar location. This enables additional location
detection of users who have APs which may not be in publicly
available data bases, or which do not have globally unique
SSIDs. In regard of the various problems caused by the current
probing process, a privacy preserving access-point discovery
has been proposed by Lindqvist et. al [8].
In general, discovering links between any two devices is a
challenging task. In [11] the geographical proximity sensing
capabilities of bluetooth technology have been used to suggest
potential friendship links to a user. This approach relies on
an always-on application running on the user’s phone, which
constantly monitors surrounding bluetooth-enabled devices.
In [4] friendship links are predicted using a large set of
information collected from mobile phones. In both research
works, discovering a relationship is seen from the perspective
of one of the partners’, and assumes the collection of a
sustainable amount of complete information both in terms
of temporal data and number of attributes. In our case, the
amount of information is quite limited and often partial (Wi-
Fi fingerprints consist of small pieces of information, and the
information is sparse). On the other hand, the datasets we
consider are composed of a much larger set of samples, and
thus contain much more possibilities, which in turn makes the
task of linking the devices more challenging.
We propose to exploit the device’s Wi-Fi fingerprint to
group devices and the owners of those devices. The techniques
presented hereafter are widely applicable to all devices that
publicly expose the SSIDs to which they have been previously
associated. Our purpose is to show that the evaluation of
fingerprint similarity enables simple, yet efficient tracking and
profiling of mobile devices users. In light of these findings,
it is desirable that the research community investigates the
capabilities and limits of these techniques. This will, in turn,
allow for the design of appropriate countermeasures to protect
users’ privacy.
The contributions of this paper are manifold. First, we
introduce the problem of linking devices relying on monitored
wireless probes. This problem is, to the best of our knowledge,
novel and has not been explored in the literature. Second,
we consider and adapt several record linkage techniques as
fingerprint similarity metrics, to build a classifier that, given
two fingerprints, can determine with high accuracy whether
the two devices belong to individuals with an established
relationship. This tool, when used with suitable record linkage
techniques, validates an intuitive observation: the two separate
devices belonging to two socially linked individuals most
likely share common SSIDs. However, only the existence of a
large and/or rare overlap in SSIDs between the two fingerprints
results in establishing the links between individuals with
an established social relationship. These results are tested
and validated on real world data. By passively monitoring
broadcast Wi-Fi probes in the city of Sydney, Australia for
a period of 100 days, we have collected fingerprints of more
than 8K unique devices and more than 24K different SSIDs.
Additionally, we have collected a control dataset comprising of
device fingerprints representing 30 social relationships, which
we use to validate the classifier. We then apply selected metrics
to the public dataset and analyse the characteristics of the
detected links.
We envision several possible uses of these techniques, not
all of them malicious. In particular, in cases of criminal
investigations, where the Wi-Fi device fingerprint of a known
suspect is collected. Forensics analysts can for instance, collect
the fingerprints of users in the suspect’s neighborhood, and our
classifier could allow them to distinguish if a set of individuals
are likely to have a social relationship with the suspect. As
a second use case, wireless service providers could gather
valuable information across a specific geographical area to
send extremely targeted advertisements to users they deem to
be socially linked to their (known) customers. For example,
when a group of people have been identified as linked through
a friendship relation, the knowledge of a single individual’s
age can allow the service provider to infer the whole group’s
age category. This would enable very targeted and efficient ad
campaigns.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
overview the related work, and present the background related
to the IEEE 802.11 standard probe requests, along with
the details of our data collection and observations on the
collected dataset. The feasibility of discovering links between
devices based on their fingerprint is analyzed in Section III.
In Section IV the proposed detection mechanism is applied to
a wild dataset. A discussion is presented in section V. Finally
we conclude in Section VI.
II. WI-FI SERVICE DISCOVERY AND DEVICE
FINGERPRINT COLLECTION
In this section, we introduce the Wi-Fi service discovery
and present the underlying mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11
protocol. We then describe the methodology we have used to
collect the set of Wi-Fi fingerprints belonging to various Wi-Fi
enabled devices and finally we present some observations on
the collected dataset.
A. Wi-Fi service discovery
The service discovery feature is a key element of the IEEE
802.11 standard family, which allows a Wi-Fi station to detect
other stations and access points in range. The 802.11 standard
implements two modes of service discovery.
a) Passive service discovery: In passive mode, access
points are advertising services to stations in range using
beacons, which are broadcasted periodically on the access
point’s operating channel. Stations passively listen for these
beacons, while switching through the set of possible chan-
nels. Depending on the frequency on which the beacons are
transmitted, and the channel switching speed and strategy, the
resulting lengthy discovery of an AP [7] may not be suitable
for mobile devices.
b) Active service discovery: In the active service discov-
ery mode, the wireless station actively searches for known APs
by probing each channel. The probing consists in broadcasting
probe request messages for known APs and then listening for
probe response messages . The probe request messages are
management frames defined by the 802.11 standard, which
embed the SSID of the target AP. The probing is repeated on
each channel until the station successfully associates to an AP.
Compared to the passive mode, actively probing the network
for known APs has the advantage of reducing potentially
long service discovery delays. Indeed, following a complete
cycle through the channels, the wireless station is guaranteed
to discover all the known APs in range. In addition, the
active service discovery mode is required in the case of
wireless networks with a hidden SSID, when the AP is not
broadcasting beacons with its associated SSID embedded into
the management frames.
B. Wi-Fi Fingerprint of a device
We note that the active service discovery process is enabled
on a large number of operating systems (e.g. iOS, Google An-
droid, Windows). As a consequence, when the devices running
those OSs are out of range of a known AP, they continuously
broadcast probe request messages. The latter contain the MAC
address of the device , and as such uniquely identify the device.
While listening in to traffic containing these management
frames (broadcasted in plain text), an eavesdropper can easily
collect the set of announced SSIDs i.e. the Wi-Fi fingerprint
and associate them with a specific device. In the following
sub-sections, we present our experimentation approach and
characteristics of the collected Wi-Fi fingerprints.
C. Fingerprint collection
For our dataset collection, we have used a netbook with
a Wi-Fi interface set to monitoring mode1 and a packet
analysis tool to filter out the probe messages2. For each probe
request, we record a time stamp, the source MAC address, the
destination MAC address, and the content of the SSID field.
As mentioned previously, in active probing mode, the probe
requests are broadcasted. Notably, since the MAC address of
the AP associated to the target SSID is not available, we
cannot uniquely identify the AP to which the device has been
previously associated. Indeed, the same SSID can simply be
used by several APs, and the number of APs associated to an
SSID ranges from one, e.g. a personal AP with a “unique”
name such as the concatenation of the first bytes of the
AP MAC address and the Internet service provider name, to
several thousands of APs, default equipment SSIDs such as
NETGEAR or common hotspot names such as BTOpenzone or
McDonald’s FREE WiFi.
Our study was conducted on two types of Wi-Fi fingerprint
data sets. First, we collected fingerprints advertised by wireless
devices in the city of Sydney (Australia) over a period of 6
months. The monitoring (fingerprint collection) was performed
by one of the authors, during the daily commute and various
social activities. The rate at which fingerprints have been
collected depended on the density of the surrounding area,
and can go up to several 10’s of devices per minute.
The collected dataset initially contained over 24.000 unique
devices and 30.000 different advertised SSIDs. In this data
set a large fraction (more than 60%) of the devices had a
fingerprint reduced to one SSID. As it is unlikely that a
large number of devices have been associated to only one
AP, we believe that those fingerprints may have been partially
collected3. Therefore we have decided to discard them and
base our study only on the devices with fingerprints with at
least two SSIDs. After this filtering, the dataset still contained
1We used the driver and software provided by the aircrack suite to monitor
Wi-Fi frames.
2We used tshark, the command-line version of wireshark
3Fingerprint of size 1 can be explain by several reasons. It can come from
an partial collection of the fingerprint, e.g. the device wasn’t in range long
enough to collect all the SSIDs. It is also possible that those SSIDs correspond
to AP with hidden SSID.
Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution function of the fingerprint size (number of
SSID per device).
Fig. 2. Cumulative distribution function of the number of device per SSID.
8834 devices and 26262 SSIDs. This dataset is referred to as
PubProbes.
A second dataset has been collected from a set of volunteers,
with known device MAC addresses, also by our monitoring
devices. This dataset is composed of 30 fingerprint pairs with
a well established and known (disclosed) underlying social
link. This dataset is referred to as VolunteerProbes.
During our fingerprint collection campaign, we have ob-
served that the frequency at which the fingerprints are collected
depends on the density of devices in the surrounding area. It
can range from one to several dozens of devices per minute.
In fact, probe requests are transmitted within small bursts.
The frequency at which those bursts are emitted over a given
channel depends on the device and more particularly on the
operating system/driver [5]. The average interval between any
two bursts from the same device varies from 50 to 60 seconds.
Conservatively, being in range of any station for 60 seconds
could be sufficient to collect the whole fingerprint of a device.
However, it is important to note that due to potential loss of
probes (e.g. when the quality of the channel is low), several
bursts may be required to collect the complete set of SSIDs
broadcasted by a device.
c) Observations on the collected dataset: Within the
PubProbes dataset, the size of the fingerprints varies from
one to 100 SSIDs, and has an average size of 5.34. Figure 1
shows the cumulative distribution of the number of SSIDs per
fingerprint; it shows, that large majority of the fingerprints
have a size lower than 20, while some fingerprints contains
more than 80 SSIDs. Figure 2 shows the cumunlative distri-
bution of number of fingerprint per SSID. We can observe that
a large fraction of the SSIDs are unique to a single fingerprint
while on the other hand, a few very popular SSIDs are shared
among a large number of fingerprints. As a consequence of
this SSID diversity, each fingerprint is unique, which makes it
an excellent unique identifier. We note that those observation
are similar to those drawn based on a similar dataset collected
on a university campus by Rose et. al. [12].
III. LINKABILITY OF THE DEVICES
As outlined in the introduction, our interest is in measuring
the similarity between the Wi-Fi fingerprints of various de-
vices, which can in turn allow us to link the devices and the
owners of these devices. Many well-known Record Linkage
(RL) (alternatively, Entity Resolution) techniques have been
successfully used to find records that may belong to the
same entity in two or more databases. In RL terminology,
two records that have been matched are said to be linked
(we will use the same term throughout this work). To the
best of our knowledge, the application of record linkage
techniques to link Wi-Fi fingerprints is novel and it presents
several challenges on its own. Information retrieval techniques
typically measure distances between two documents (or a
search query and a document), which are a set of words and
thus need to be adapted for our purpose. Therefore, before
presenting the study of fingerprint similarity in the wild, we
start by studying the characteristics of fingerprint pairs with a
known underlying link. For this purpose, we use ground truth
evidence (the VolunteerProbes dataset) in which social links
between devices’ holders are known.
A. The (VolunteerProbes) dataset characteristics
We have collected the Wi-Fi fingerprints from a set of vol-
unteers, along with the fingerprints of individuals with whom
they maintain a strong social relationship (family members,
close friends, flat mates). Once the VolunteerProbes dataset
has been collected, all the devices pairs have been considered
and categorized into two groups: those for which we verified
that their owners are linked (we refer to this set as L for
linked), and others for which we verified that their owners are
not linked, referred to as NL for non linked group of device
pairs.
To assist with the analysis, we first define the frequency of
an SSID z within a corpus, F , that is the ratio between the
fingerprints X containing the SSID z, over the total number
of fingerprints in the corpus: F as fz =
|X,z∈X|
|F| . In our
case, the corpus F is the set of total fingerprints from the
PubProbes and VolunteerProbes datasets. The PubProbes
dataset serves as a reference, since we can be confident
that the SSID frequency estimation, although coarse, gives a
stable frequency measure of the common SSIDs. Indeed, in
fz we will measure the number of occurrences of SSIDs in
the collected sample, and hence we are assigning maximum



























































Fig. 3. Intersection size distribution for Wi-Fi fingerprints pairs collected
from volunteers.
Since, as we will discuss next, we are interested in the rarity
of SSIDs in intersections and it is highly likely that common
SSIDs would be overrepresented in the PubProbes dataset, a
simple frequency estimation as defined by fz can be used for
this purpose.
B. Characteristics of fingerprint pairs
Our approach determines the similarity between any two
fingerprints primarily on the SSIDs they have in common,
rather than on the semantic analysis of the Wi-Fi fingerprints.
We focus on two aspects of the fingerprint intersections:
the size and the rarity. The size of the intersection simply
represents the number of SSIDs shared by the two fingerprints.
The rarity of the intersection of any two fingerprints X and
Y , denoted Rarity(X,Y ) hereafter, measures its uniqueness
and is equal to the product of the frequency estimation of the
elements in the intersection. The higher the rarity score, the







− log fz if X ∩ Y 6= ∅
0 otherwise
(1)
where fz , the frequency of the element z.
Figure 3 shows the distributions of the intersection for both
sets L and NL of fingerprint pairs. In particular, we can clearly
observe that the size of the intersection is at least equal to one
for all pairs with an established social link, while it is empty
for more than 90% of the pairs that are not linked. Put simply,
Wi-Fi fingerprints of devices with owners who are socially
linked are more likely to have a non-empty intersection. The
size of the intersection seems to be the first discriminatory
characteristic for the existence of a relation between devices
holders. However, as illustrated by Figure 3, matching the
intersection sizes, although the two distributions differ, does
not always indicate that the two devices belong to socially
Fig. 4. Intersection rarity distribution for device pairs with and without social
link.
linked individuals. The probability that two devices are linked
should then depend on: (1) the size of the intersection between
the two fingerprints; and (2) how likely is that intersection in
the other samples.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the rarity for
the Intersection sets of pairs (again for both L and NL). We
observe that the linked pairs are characterized by the highest
rarity scores whereas a large majority of the non linked pairs
have a low score. In general, almost all the rarity scores of
the “linked” fingerprints intersection (in L) are higher than the
non linked devices rarity scores. This validates an intuitive
observation: having a non empty intersection between two
device fingerprints is not sufficient to consider a social link
between the devices holders, as it should be necessary to
include the rarity of the shared SSIDs. The underlying idea
is that a common SSID does not provide much information
on a potential social link between specific users. As shown in
Section II, some SSIDs might be shared by a large number of
devices’ fingerprints, e.g. hotspots and redundant by-default
SSIDs.
C. Similarity metrics
To infer a social link between two devices holders, we need
to compare the similarity between two sets of SSIDs. In this
paper, we consider a well known set of similarity metrics, used
in record linkage related problems. The argument for using
the theory and techniques utilised for information retrieval i.e.
computing of document similarity, is that we can view the
SSIDs as a collection of words. We have tested a number
of similarity metrics and in this paper we present those that
produce the best results, based on considering either the size
or the rarity of the SSID intersection sets.
1) Jaccard Index: The Jaccard index simply considers the
similarity of two samples, as the ratio the ratio of the intersec-
tion’s cardinal by the union’s cardinal, i.e. J(X,Y ) = |X∩Y ||X∪Y | .
The Jaccard Index ranges from 0 (disjoints sets) to 1 (identical
sets). It only consider the intersection size and does not take
into account the rarity of the elements in the intersection.
2) IDF similarity: In this case we use a well known
information retrieval tool called TF-IDF. However, TF-IDF
similarity measures the distance between two documents (or
a search query and a document), which are set of words. We
need to slightly alter the TF-IDF measure to apply it to Wi-
Fi fingerprints instead. The term frequency-inverse document
frequency (TF-IDF) is a weight used to evaluate how important
is a word to a document that belongs to a corpus. The weight
assigned to a word increases proportionally to the logarithm
of the number of times the word appears in the corpus but the
importance decreases for common words in the corpus.
The TF-IDF of term i in document X is TF-IDF(X, i) =
TFX,i.IDFi, where TFX,i is the term frequency of i in doc-
ument X defined as TFX,i =
|{t∈X:t=i}|
|X| and IDFi is the
inverse document frequency of the term i in the considered
corpus. In our case the inverse document frequency is simply




The TF-IDF is often used to measure the similarity between
two documents, in the following way: first the TF-IDF is
computed over all the terms in the two documents, and the
results are stored in two vectors; then the similarity between
the two vectors is computed, for example using a cosine
similarity measure. In our case, terms appear at most once
in a fingerprint. Therefore, we replaced the term frequency
component by a binary function: 1 if the fingerprint contains


















The Cosine-idf ranges from 0 (disjoints sets) to 1 (identical
sets).
3) Adamic similarity: In [2], Adamic & Adar proposed a
metric to estimate between personal pages similarities, and
used this metric to infer social links. The Adamic metric
takes into account the frequency of the pages elements by







where fz is the frequency of the element z. The Adamic
metric ranges from 0 (disjoints sets) to a given maximum value
depending on the considered corpus. Notably, this metric takes
into account both the rarity and the size of the intersection.
4) Modified Adamic similarity: Since the Adamic metric
considers the logarithm of the element’s frequency, it naturally
tends to reduce the impact of the rarest elements. We argue that
the rarest elements, i.e. those shared by only two fingerprints,
are actually those containing the more information about a
potential link. In order to strengthen the similarity metric,
we propose to modify the Adamic metric by replacing the
logarithm of the frequency by a power of the frequency. Using
a power of the frequency instead of a logarithm-based value
will strengthen the importance of the rarest SSIDs among the










where fz is the frequency of the element z, and q is the
power considered. This metric ranges from 0 (disjoints sets)
to a given maximum value depending on the considered
corpus. Similarly to the original Adamic metric, the Psim-q
metric takes into account both the rarity and the size of the
intersection. Several values for q have been tried, and the best
results were obtained for q = 3. Therefore, from now on, we
will consider the metric Psim-3.
D. Evaluation
Our goal is to assess how accurately Wi-Fi fingerprints can
be used to link two different individuals. For this purpose,
we build a classifier to separate the two sets L and NL,
respectively of linked and non linked pairs of devices fin-
gerprints. In order to fairly estimate the performance of the
classifier, the fingerprint pairs were separated, shuffled and a
list of fingerprints derived from L and NL was constructed.
The task of the classifier is to re-link the fingerprints in L
maximizing the fingerprints couples correctly linked while
linking as few incorrect couples as possible. In practice, for
each possible couple in the list our classifier computed the
similarity metrics and kept only the couples with highest
similarity. If the fingerprints pair similarity value is above
a threshold then the candidate couple is considered linked;
otherwise it is non-linked.
a) Classification performances: Binary classifiers are
primarily evaluated using the classical false/true posi-
tives/negatives indicators. We can consider our binary classifier
as a simple hypothesis test where the classifier is a detection
scheme that tests the following null hypothesis: The pair of
devices corresponds to an underlying social link. Given a
set of n pairs of devices, containing nP pairs with a social
link (positive) and nN with no social link (negative). In our
case, we are interested in finding fingerprint pairs that are
actually linked (true positives which number is nTP ) while
minimizing the number of pairs that are linked by mistake
(false positives, which number is nFP ). In addition, let us
consider nFN as the number of false negatives and nTN as
the number of true negatives. The false positive rate (FPR)
is the proportion of all devices do not corresponding to an
underlying link that have been wrongly reported as positive by
the test, so FPR = nFP
nFP+nTN
. Similarly, the true positive rate
(TPR) is the proportion of linked devices that have been rightly
reported as such by the test, and we have TPR = nTP
nTP+nFN
.
To evaluate the efficiency of the classifier, we first plot
in Figure 5 ROC (Receiver Operation Characteristics) curves
observed for different similarity metrics and several thresholds.
These plots show, for each threshold, the point corresponding
to the false positive rate along the x-axis and to the true
positive rate along the y-axis, with one curve per similarity













































































Fig. 6. TPR and FPR as a function of the threshold for Cosine-IDF and
Psim-3 metrics.
graph a curve is, the better, since such points correspond to
high true positive rates (i.e. a high proportion of positives
being reported as such by the test) for low false positive
rates (i.e. a small proportion of negatives incorrectly reported
as positives). We observe that from this perspective Cosine-
IDF and Psim-3 metrics outperform the other metric, offering
excellent compromises between high true positive rates and
law false positive rates.
Since the Jaccard index does not take into account the rarity
of the common SSIDs, and hence suggests that the rarity of
the intersection is less important than its cardinal, with no
surprise, we can verify that it performs less efficient results
than other metrics. Comparing the results of the Adamic
metric and our modified version, the Psim-q, we can observe
that the change of weighting function, i.e. power of the
frequency rather than a logarithmic function, has significantly
improved the performances. Where the Adamic displayed poor
performances, the Psim-3 performs as well as the two best
metrics.
Another interesting property of ROC curves is that they
show the optimal range for the threshold. Indeed, as the slope
of the ROC curve flattens, the increase in true positive rate
is proportionally smaller than the corresponding increase in
false positives. In other words, a lower threshold, although
it always increases the true positive rate of the test, is not
always productive as it eventually does more damage than
good through increased false positive rates. In general, this
means that the threshold of the similarity tests should be set
to a value that yields a point in the “elbow” of the ROC
curve. In practice, the choice of the threshold depends on
the application of the classifier: one might favor detecting as
much true positives as possible at the expense of a higher false
positive rate; while in other cases, one might be interested in
increasing the threshold so as to detect fewer true positives
but minimizing the probability of mistakenly linking any two
devices. We will now concentrate on the Cosine-IDF and Psim-
3 metrics as both of them yield at least similar results than
the other considered metrics.
Figure 6 shows the true positive rates and false positive rates
variation for various thresholds, respectively for the Psim-
3 and Cosine-IDF metrics. As expected, a higher threshold
results in a more aggressive classification test that correctly
classifies only a few of actually linked devices, but on the other
end wrongly reports a tiny proportion of non linked devices.
Our study focuses on a set of thresholds providing optimal
performances. Social and professional graphs are rather sparse,
i.e. the number of existing edges is much smaller than the
number of potential edges. Therefore the number of false,
i.e. vertex pairs not connected by an edge, will be much
higher than the number of true, i.e. vertex pairs connected
by an edge. Given the difference between the size of the
positive and negative sets, we focus on thresholds with low
corresponding FPR, namely FPR < 0.1. Even with this strict
constraint, thresholds with high and medium TPR are possible.
For instance, for the Psim-3 a threshold of t = 1.5710−5 leads
to a TPR= 0.8 and FPR= 0.0772. Even if a part of the positive
sets are missed, this will limit the number of false positive.
In our use case example, the investigation of a criminal
group, two cases may be possible: either the goal is to
reduce the set of suspects to a more manageable size, or
to use the result of the classifier as an evidence. In the first
case, additional information may be available on the potential
suspects, and could be be used to further refine the results
returned by the classifier. Therefore having a high FPR may
not be an issue. On the other hand, as missing positives is not
acceptable, a high TPR should be targeted, e.g. by using Psim-
3 with a threshold t = 1.19 10−8, which results in TPR = 1
and FPR = 0.2618. In the second case, false positives are
not acceptable, hence the FPR must be as small as possible.
Therefore, a good threshold for the Psim-3 could be t = 0.162
which results in TPR = 0.1 and FPR = 0.
IV. LINKING DEVICES IN THE WILD
We apply the link detection scheme using the metrics
defined in Section III-D to the public PubProbes dataset.
This dataset is composed of more than 8K unique device
identifiers, with collected fingerprints comprising of more than
TABLE I
SELECTED THRESHOLD AND ASSOCIATED NUMBER OF PAIRS DETECTED
IN THE PubProbes DATASET. CORRESPONDING TPR AND FPR ON THE
CONTROLED DATA SET.
Thresh. Nb. detected pairs TPR4 FPR4
Cosine-IDF 0.188 215 384 0.5 0
0.117 502 102 0.8 0.0300
0.0153 3 934 564 1 0.2446
Psim-3 0.162 408 0.1 0
1.57 10
−5 88 476 0.8 0.0772
1.19 10
−8 3 812 524 1 0.2618
26K distinct SSIDs. We note that, since this dataset consists of
fingerprints collected in the wild, no information on the links
between the devices is available. In the light of our results in
Section III-D, we will focus on two similarity metrics: Cosine-
IDF and Psim-3. We consider three threshold values for each
metric. The three thresholds have been selected respectively
to yield (resp.) to values of FPR = 0, TPR = 1 and a
desired trade-off between between FPR and TPR, from the
results in Section III-D. In the following, we analyze the
characteristics of the resulting set of linked devices from the
PubProbes dataset. We derive additional insights about the
general applicability of the selected metrics.
A. Results
Table I summarizes the threshold values chosen for the
Cosine-IDF and the Psim-3 metrics, with the corresponding
FPR and TPR values as obtained for the VolunteerProbes
dataset.
Our classifier looks for potentially similar fingerprints based
on the selected threshold. Table I shows the number of linked
device pairs for both chosen metrics. The Cosine-IDF metric,
independently from the used threshold, detects a relatively
large number of device pairs, compared to the Psim-3 metric.
We note a property of the Cosine-IDF metric, which may result
in inconsistencies when attempting to detect links between
devices in the wild. When two fingerprints are identical, the
resulting similarity score is always the highest (i.e. equal
to one), regardless of the size of the fingerprints and the
frequency of those SSIDs in the corpus.On the other hand,
we note that Psim-3 (and more generally Psim-q) is more
sensitive to both the variations in the number of SSIDs shared
between the two compared fingerprints and the rarity of those
SSIDs. In particular, in case of identical fingerprints, the Psim-
3 similarity score still depends on the frequency (rarity) and
the number of the common SSIDs.
Given the device pairs detected in PubProbes dataset,
we further explore the underlying reasons why the devices
have been linked. We now focus on the characteristics of
the intersections of linked fingerprints. The rarity of SSIDs
4The TPR and FPR in this table are those obtained with the
VolunteerProbes data set in section III. They do not imply anything on
the TPR and FPR that will be obtained on the PubProbes data set.
comprising these intersections is shown in Figure 7, while the
size of intersections is shown in Figure 8.
(a) Cosine-IDF
(b) Psim-3
Fig. 7. CDF of the Intersection rarity for device pairs detected in the





















































Fig. 8. Intersection size for device pairs detected in the PubProbes dataset
for selected thresholds.
We observe that for the Psim-3 metric, when the highest
threshold is applied (curve labeled t = 0.162 in Figures 7
and 8), more than 60% of the intersections of linked devices
fingerprints have their sizes larger than 2, while for the two
TABLE II
NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR EACH DEVICE IN THE VolunteerProbes
DATASET WHEN PLUNGED IN THE PubProbes DATASET.
Thresh. Average Min Max
Cosine-IDF 0.188 34.025 0 142
0.117 80.65 2 307
0.0153 555.175 2 1411
Psim-3 0.162 0.475 0 2
1.57 10
−5 28.125 0 238
1.19 10
−8 437.425 2 1208
lower thresholds (t = 1.71 10−4 and 1.19 10−8), the vast ma-
jority of the intersections are reduced to one SSID. In addition,
these two lower thresholds result in a set of links in which a
large majority of the intersection SSIDs have a rarity of less
than 18. When applying the the highest threshold (t = 0.162),
the majority of linked fingerprints possess rare SSIDs. For the
Cosine-IDF, the thresholds variation seems to have a small
impact on the rarity and the size of the intersections of linked
fingerprints. Indeed for the three thresholds, almost all the
intersections are reduced to only one SSID. The rarity for the
two higher thresholds appear to be sensibly similar and in the
three cases the majority of intersections has a rarity lower than
10.
B. Detecting links from the VolunteerProbes dataset embed-
ded in the PubProbes dataset
We now focus on a scenario where given a device and its fin-
gerprint, we would like to detect the potentially linked devices
from a large dataset. For this purpose, the VolunteerProbes
dataset is embedded into the PubProbes dataset and we
apply the classifier (considering our chosen two metrics) to
retrieve the links a priori known from the VolunteerProbes
dataset established relationships. For each device in the
VolunteerProbes data set, we collect all the devices returned
by the classifier as linked to the considered device. The number
of returned candidates is considered as a performance metric
as it quantifies how well the initial set, composed of more than
8K devices, can be reduced to a more manageable size.
Table II presents the average/min/max number of retrieved
candidates for each threshold. Obviously, for the two metrics
decreasing the thresholds’ value significantly increase the
number of candidates. Again, depending on the application,
one might favor detecting all the positives at the expense
of false positives and a larger number of candidates. The
Cosine-IDF returns much larger sets of candidates than the
Psim-3. Focusing on the Psim-3 metric, we observe that the
most restrictive threshold (t = 1.57 10−5) yields to 0.475
candidates in average and a maximum of 2. The candidates’
set is rather small, but the threshold is so high that it may
miss some positive (in this case the TPR is only 0.1). For
the intermediate threshold (t = 1.57 10−5) we observe that
in average 28.125 candidates are returned, which represents
0.35% of the PubProbes data set. For the lowest thresold
(t = 1.19 10−8), the average number rise to 437.425, i.e.
5.4% of the full set. This last threshold yields a TPR of 1 on
the VolunteerProbes data set, but when it is applied to the
PubProbes data set it returned large sets of candidates.
V. DISCUSSION
This work shows that it is clearly possible to tie physical
Wi-Fi devices together and, most likely, to infer relationship
between the owners of those devices. This open up the
potential for the proposed technique to be used as an additional
tool when investigating real world crimes. It may however also
be subject to abuse and could result in breaches in privacy.
A. Addressing possible limitations
The linked device pairs we used as ground truth have been
collected from a set of volunteers devices. We have shown
that, in this sample dataset, Wi-Fi fingerprints can be used to
infer the relationship between the devices owners. However,
one might argue that this sample may not be sufficiently
representative of the whole population. We tested our tool
in linking devices of other unknown individuals with no a
priori knowledge of any established relationship. This was
due to the difficulty of gathering ground truth evidence.
However, a more thorough analysis of the collected public
Wi-Fi fingerprints is left for future work, to try to establish
implicit relationship (e.g. based on semantic analysis of some
SSIDs in the fingerprints).
Finding linked devices in a population requires time that
is quadratic in the population size, as all possible pairs must
be tested for similarity. This might be too costly if one has
millions of devices to match. A solution to this problem is to
divide the matching task in two phases. First, divide devices
in clusters that are likely be linked. For example, one could
choose devices that share at least one (even very popular)
SSID, thus restricting the number of combinations that need
to be tried. Second, test all possible combinations within a
cluster.
Finally, during our experiments, we noticed that some
operating systems broadcast the SSIDs with a meaningful
order which represents either the preferences of users or the
most recent associations to the APs. Our technique could be
improved by exploiting this additional information.
B. Counter-measures
Our technique primarily exploits the fact that wireless
fingerprints can be easily collected. Disabling, or at least
reducing the frequency of active probe requests is a first step
to preventing large scale linkage of devices. However, as pre-
viously discussed, this will in turn create performances issues
and might prevent devices from associating to APs with hidden
SSIDs. Another class of solutions requires the deployment of a
new dedicated protocol. Privacy preserving discovery services
have been proposed in [8], [9]. The latter achieves the goal of
hiding the SSIDs when probing, however they require software
modifications in current access points and devices, which will
hamper the adoption of such proposals.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a mechanism capable of detecting links be-
tween individuals, by exploiting the information broadcast
in plaintext by their wireless devices. We have shown on a
controled dataset that a relationship can be easily detected. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first use of wireless data
to establish link between users. This work demonstrates yet
another privacy breach allowed by the 802.11 probe requests,
and this should further support the initiatives aiming at privacy
preserving Access Point discovery [8].
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